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AGAINST PHYSICALISM-PLUS-GOD:  
HOW CREATION ACCOUNTS FOR  
DIVINE ACTION IN NATURE’S WORLD
Lydia Jaeger
It is often assumed that contemporary physics is more hospitable to divine 
action (and human freedom) than classical mechanics. The article criticizes 
this assumption on the grounds of both physics and theology. Most currently 
discussed models of divine action do not challenge the physicalist assump-
tion that physics provides a true and complete description of nature’s causal 
web. Thus they resemble physicalism-plus-God. Taking up suggestions from 
Herman Dooyeweerd and Henri Blocher, I propose an alternative frame-
work for divine action in the world. It takes creation as the starting-point 
to understand the world and leads to a non-reductionist, multidimensional 
picture of reality.
1. Divine Action in the Contemporary Science-and-Theology Literature
The question of how God acts in the world receives wide interest in the 
current science-and-theology debate. Between 1990 and 2005, the Center 
for Theology and the Natural Sciences (Berkeley) and the Vatican Obser-
vatory co-sponsored a series of international research conferences on “sci-
entific perspectives on divine action,” leading to the publication of six 
major volumes with contributions from over fifty scientists, philosophers 
and theologians.1 And this research project, though impressive, cannot 
claim any monopoly. There is a plethora of other significant contributions 
to the ongoing discussion on divine action in the world.2
1See in particular Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, Arthur R. Peacocke, eds., Chaos and 
Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Vatican/Berkeley: Vatican Observatory/
CTNS, 1995); Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, and C. J. Isham, eds., Quantum Cosmology 
and the Laws of Nature: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of N.D. 
Press, 1996); Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, Theo C. Meyering, and Michael A. Arbib, 
eds., Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Vatican/Berkeley: 
Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 1999); Robert J. Russell, Philip Clayton, Kirk Wegter-McNelly, 
and John Polkinghorne, eds., Quantum Mechanics: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action 
(Vatican City/Berkeley: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 2001).
2See for example: Keith Ward, Divine Action: Examining God’s Role in an Open and Emer-
gent Universe (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2007); Ted Peters and Nathan 
Hallanger, eds., God’s Action In Nature’s World: Essays in Honour of Robert John Russell (Alder-
shot, UK: Ashgate, 2006).
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Most accounts—and in particular those developed by scientist-theo-
logians—strive to provide a model of divine action which is compatible 
with contemporary physics and which does not involve any violation of 
physical laws. Authors differ in what aspect of physics they focus on. But 
many seem to agree on the idea that indeterministic features of twentieth- 
century physical theories are important in this respect. At least, the 
belief that God acts in the world is thought of as being more easily accom-
modated with present-day physics than with Newtonian physics and its 
deterministic laws.
As my critique will rely only on general features of such accounts, it 
is sufficient here to mention two standard ways of “making space” for 
divine action through the indeterminacies of contemporary physics, with-
out going into details. Firstly, ever since the probabilistic structure of the 
atomic world became clear, quantum mechanics has been used to provide 
room for divine (and also human) action. As the quantum mechanical 
laws specify only the statistics of measurement outcomes, some consid-
er that God can choose to bring about a specific result without breaking 
physical laws. Occasionally, such a microscopic event can have macro-
scopic consequences and thereby influence the course of history. Robert 
Russell, founder and director of CTNS, is a prolific defender of this view 
in the current debate.3 Ian Barbour, who is sometimes credited with hav-
ing founded the science-and-theology dialogue in its current form,4 takes 
advantage of another feature of quantum mechanics, “non-local, non-
causal, instantaneous connections” as exhibited for example in the EPR-
experiment, in order to account for God’s involvement in nature.5
Secondly, other authors, for example John Polkinghorne, advocate chaos 
theory as a possible frame for understanding divine action in nature’s 
world. There is, however, an important distinction to be made between 
quantum mechanical uncertainty and the impossibility to predict the fu-
ture evolution of a chaotic system, due to its exponential sensitivity to 
boundary conditions. Probabilities in quantum theory are objective. The 
system is objectively undetermined before a measurement is carried out; 
considering it to be in a specific state beforehand (which we would sim-
ply ignore) would contradict standard quantum mechanics.6 In contrast, 
3For a detailed presentation of his view and how it has developed over time, cf. Kirk 
Wetger-McNelly, “Atoms May Be Small, But They’re Everywhere: Robert Russell’s Theo-
logical Engagement with the Quantum Revolution,” in Peters and Hallanger, God’s Action 
in Nature’s World, 93–111, and John Polkinghorne, “Quantum Theology,” ibid., 137–145.
4Ted Peters, “Robert John Russell’s Contribution to the Theology and Science Dialogue,” 
in Peters and Hallanger, God’s Action in Nature’s World, 5, considers Ian G. Barbour, Issues 
in Science and Religion (San Francisco: Harper, 1966), to have been “the Cambrian break-
through” in this field.
5Ian G. Barbour, “Indeterminacy, Holism and God’s Action,” in Peters and Hallanger, 
God’s Action in Nature’s World, 118.
6See for example Peter Mittelstaedt, The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the Mea-
surement Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 84. It is safe to ignore in 
this context deterministic reformulations of the quantum mechanical formalism (making 
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chaotic unpredictability is manifested in classical systems, governed by 
completely deterministic laws (it is not clear if there is a quantum ana-
logue to chaos; it might well be that quantum indeterminacy “smears” out 
chaotic effects). Although there is no way to predict the future evolution 
over a certain time span, the uncertainty is epistemological and expresses 
our ignorance. Thus Polkinghorne needs more than an appeal to a physi-
cal theory in order to allow for divine action in the places where nature’s 
behavior is not completely determined by physical law. In fact, he brings 
in critical realism: we should
‘give primacy in interpretation to the observed behavior.’ From this Polk-
inghorne claims that the observation that physical chaotic systems behave in a 
random-like manner (i.e. that their behavior is indistinguishable-for-us from 
actually random-like behavior) is an indication that such systems are random, 
i.e. indeterministic.7
Once indeterminacies in chaotic systems are postulated, divine action can 
fix specific outcomes which are left open by the physical laws and thereby 
have an impact on the world, without “breaking the rules”—quite analo-
gous to the quantum mechanical case.
2. The Unscientific Character of  
Scientist-Theologians’ Models of Divine Action
Russell’s, Barbour’s, Polkinghorne’s, and others’ models for divine action 
are driven by the conviction that theologians should listen to science 
when speaking about the world and therefore articulate their doctrines in 
a form which makes sense in the light of our current scientific knowledge. 
I am sympathetic to the idea that theology should not be done in an ivory 
tower (or in a hermit’s hut, to stay with religious imagery) and therefore 
should interact with our best-available scientific knowledge. Neverthe-
less, I am deeply unsatisfied with the currently discussed models in the 
science-and-theology literature. They can and should be criticized on sci-
entific, philosophical and theological grounds.
Let us start with the scientific arguments as these get right to the heart 
of the motivation behind the pursued project. Accounts using quantum 
mechanics and chaos theory try to make space for divine action by appeal-
ing to what is seen as indeterminacies left open by physical theory. But in 
fact it is an illusion to think that quantum mechanics or chaos theory 
leave holes in the scientific description of a system, holes which can be 
filled in by divine action.
use of non-local hidden variables). If quantum mechanical probabilities are after all only 
apparent “macroscopic” epiphenomena arising from a deterministic subatomic world, 
there is even less hope that quantum theory will provide more room for divine action than 
deterministic Newtonian physics.
7Taede A. Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God: Divine Action and Scientism (Leuven: 
Peeters, 2004), 81–82, quoting John Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction (Lon-
don/Minnesota: SPCK/Fortress Press, 1998), 42. Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God, 33–105, 
provides a thorough presentation and careful critique of Polkinghorne’s account.
298 Faith and Philosophy
Firstly, quantum mechanical probabilities do not stem from our igno-
rance, but are genuine features of the system. For example, if the position 
of a system is known, its momentum is undetermined. More generally, two 
complementary observables are jointly determined only above the limit 
indicated by Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation. This indeterminacy is not 
epistemological, but objective. It is not only the case that we do not know the 
exact value, but even the hypothetical attribution of an exact value leads 
to a contradiction with the laws of quantum mechanics. Thus—as long as 
the laws of quantum mechanics are valid—not even an omniscient Being 
can know it, nor can an omnipotent Being (or anybody else) influence or 
change it. The indeterminacy is objective and does not provide any room 
for divine action, without violating the quantum mechanical laws.8
Nor is it possible to appeal to quantum mechanics’ non-locality in order 
to give God a home in the world. Einstein, together with Podolsky and 
Rosen, proposed an experiment to prove the incompleteness of quantum 
mechanics (as a Spinozist, Einstein could not accept indeterminacy at a fun-
damental level). Through the conceptual work of Bell and the experiments 
done by Aspect, the EPR-experiment now serves to establish the non-local 
properties of microscopic systems, of which quantum mechanics offers a 
complete and objectively indeterministic description. EPR-correlations do 
not exhibit any incompleteness of the quantum mechanical description, 
which would allow for a theological add-on. It should also be remembered 
that they do not permit (as far as we know) the transmission of any infor-
mation between distant points.9 Thus it would be wrong to suggest that 
such non-local phenomena show the openness of physical reality to a higher 
rational level, be it a human or a divine mind.
Secondly, the situation in chaos theory is even clearer. Chaos arises, as 
far as we know, in deterministic systems. Thus in order to speak about 
God’s action in a chaotic system, one needs to account for how God can 
act in a deterministic world; but why then appeal to chaos in the first 
place? Polkinghorne’s move to bring in critical realism is very curious in-
deed. Not only does it rely on a particular philosophical view of science, 
it also uses a result derived from a deterministic model (the long-term un-
predictability of complex dynamical systems) and tries to conclude from 
it that the model is only an approximation to reality, and that nature is af-
ter all not really deterministic but contains “an intrinsic openness.”10 But 
why first appeal to science, only to subsequently dismiss the ontological 
8Peter Mittelstaedt, “On Possible Relations Between Physics and Theology,” in Proceed-
ings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, “Knowledge and Belief”, ed. W. Loeffler 
and P. Weingartner (Vienne, AU: Hölder, Pichler-Temsky, 2004), 333–334.
9Cf. Peter Mittelstaedt, “Can EPR-Correlations be Used for the Transmission of Super-
luminal Signals?,” Annalen der Physik 7 (1998), 710–715, and “Quantum Holism, Superlumi-
nality, and Einstein Causality,” Physics and Philosophy, Open Access Online Journal (2008), 
http://hdl.handle.net/2003/25801, 1–15.
10John Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God’s Interaction with the World (London: 
Templeton Foundation Press, 2005), 34–36. 
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picture that the scientific model provides? Smedes rightly complains that 
Polkinghorne’s appeal to critical realism is ad hoc.11
But even if modern physical theories offered space for divine action, 
it would be far from clear that they provided sufficient leeway in order 
to allow for relevant action. As we have seen, the question does not even 
arise for chaos theory, as all the chaotic systems we know are determin-
istic and quantum chaos is today at best an interesting research program. 
But what about quantum mechanics and its genuine uncertainties? There 
have been quantum mechanical events which had an impact on history 
(take the atomic bomb over Hiroshima). But can God restrict himself to 
act inside quantum mechanical uncertainty and still accomplish all that 
he wants to accomplish? To answer this question, we would need to have 
a clear grasp of God’s detailed projects for the world, which we don’t. 
Thus it may be easier to answer the parallel question of whether quantum 
mechanical probabilities leave enough room for human action. In fact, 
the answer is most probably no: quantum mechanical effects are several 
magnitudes too small to play any role in neurochemical brain processes.12 
This confirms doubts about whether quantum mechanics can lead to a 
sufficiently robust notion of divine action.
3. Non-reductive Physicalism
We have so far examined accounts which try to make room for divine ac-
tion by locating “holes” in the physical description of systems, building 
on what is seen to be indeterminate or incomplete causation at the micro-
scopic level. As Polkinghorne writes:
If holistic [top-down] causation is present it must be there as a genuine nov-
elty, and the structure of the relationships between the bits and pieces must 
be open enough to afford it room for manoeuvre. In some sense there must 
be gaps in the bottom-up account which this top-down action fills in, but 
those gaps must be intrinsic and ontological in character and not just con-
tingent ignorances of the details of bottom-up process. They must be “really 
there” if they are to provide the causal joint for which we are looking.13
But we have seen that neither quantum mechanics nor chaos theory lead 
to relevant gaps which could be filled in by divine action. Thus the pro-
posals on offer are pseudo-solutions built on illusion. Modern physical 
theories do not provide more space for divine action in nature than did 
11Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God, 88.
12Peter G. H. Clarke, “Determinism, Brain Function and Free Will,” Science and Christian 
Belief 22 (2010), 141–148. Among other arguments, Clarke shows that the thermal energy 
of molecules in the warm, wet environment of the brain is several orders of magnitudes 
higher than relevant energy fluctuations due to Heisenbergian uncertainty. To function 
correctly, brain cells must be immune to such thermal noise. It is thus expected that they 
are affected even less by quantum fluctuations, which are much smaller.
13John Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science (New Haven: Yale U.P., 2003), 59. 
The expression “causal joint” was brought into the discussion by Austin Farrer. Cf. Brian 
Hebblethwaite, Edward Henderson, eds., Divine Action: Studies Inspired by the Philosophical 
Theology of Austin Farrer (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1990).
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Newtonian physics. If there is a problem of God acting in Newton’s world 
(remember that Newton didn’t think there was!14), then there will be an 
analogous problem in Einstein’s and Planck’s world.
Many authors in the science-and-theology field are aware that contem-
porary physical theories are not incomplete in the sense that they would 
allow us to locate divine action in the indeterminacies they include. There-
fore, some try to provide an account of divine action which still makes 
use of such concepts as emergence and top-down causation, but which 
does not build on any “gaps” at the microscopic level. Taede Smedes pro-
vides a detailed study of one of them, Arthur Peacocke’s self-organizing 
universe.15 There is no need to go into any details here as I will provide 
an argument which shows that the combination of top-down causation 
with a physically complete description at the microscopic level is at the 
best confused, at the worst contradictory.16 I will run this argument for 
mental human action. Humans are part of the world, and it is thus easier 
to formulate the argument. If there cannot emerge any top-down cau-
sation in this more homely example, there is no hope that top-down 
causation could be of any help in understanding divine action in a physi-
cal world.
In philosophy of mind, the position which is of interest here is called 
“nonreductive physicalism.” It affirms, on the one hand, that there are 
only physical objects in the world and that physics offers a complete de-
scription of them:
The physicalist thesis is that as we go up the hierarchy of increasingly com-
plex organisms, all of the other capacities once attributed to the soul will 
also turn out to be products of complex organization, rather than properties 
of a non-material entity.17
But at the same time, rational thought is held to be possible and even to 
exert a real influence in the world (typically through top-down causation). 
As attractive as this position may be, respecting both the physical image 
of the world and avoiding reductionism, it can be retained only if we have 
an idea of the way in which the complete physical description at the mi-
croscopic level can cohabit with mental top-down causality. For it is not 
enough to propose two postulates, even if both are desirable, if we have 
14Cf. for example Edward B. Davis, “Newton’s Rejection of the ‘Newtonian World View’: 
The Role of Divine Will in Newton’s Natural Philosophy,” Science and Christian Belief 3 
(1991), 103–117. Cf. Alvin Plantinga, “What Is ‘Intervention’?,” Theology and Science 6 (2008), 
369–401, for a contemporary defense of the idea that special divine action is not incompat-
ible with science, be it classical or quantum.
15Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God, 107–171. In some sense, Barbour’s account could 
also be put in this class, although he argues for emergence from one specific aspect of the 
quantum world, i.e., non-locality.
16The argument against non-reductive physicalism which follows is taken from Lydia 
Jaeger, “Les neurosciences face à la théologie,” in L’âme et le cerveau: l’enjeu des neurosciences, 
ed. L. Jaeger (Vaux-sur-Seine/Charols: Édifac/Excelsis, 2009), 166–167.
17Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2006), 57 (printed in italics).
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not shown that they are compatible. The non-reductionist physicalist is 
therefore faced with the delicate task of providing details on the relation-
ship between cerebral states and mental states to show that a complete 
physical description of the brain is effectively possible without having to 
renounce the existence of the mind. Clearly neither the relationship of 
identity nor the relationship of causality provides a satisfactory account. 
If mental states are identical to or directly caused by cerebral states, they 
are at best epiphenomena: no top-down causality can exist.
The favored term in contemporary philosophy of mind (since its in-
troduction into the field by Donald Davidson in 1970) is that of “superve-
nience”: it is believed that in this way a relationship between brain states 
and mental states has been found that allows for both a complete physical 
description and for freedom of thought. The fundamental idea of super-
venience is easy to grasp: “No difference of one kind without a difference 
of another kind.”18 Nancey Murphy proposes the following definition:
Property S is supervenient on property B if and only if something instanti-
ates S in virtue of (as a non-causal consequence of) its instantiating B under 
circumstance c.19
But let’s be honest: this definition, despite its technical allure, is no more 
precise than the simple slogan “no difference of one kind without a differ-
ence of another kind.” The key point is the relationship between the basic 
properties B (cerebral states, in this case) and the properties S that super-
vene (mental states). Designating it by the vague expression “in virtue of” 
hardly gets us anywhere, and the same is true of the negative statement 
that it is a non-causal relationship.
Philosophers of mind have discussed at great length the concept of 
supervenience during the last forty years. These discussions have not 
produced any satisfactory results. First, one must differentiate between 
several kinds of supervenience.20 More serious is the observation that the 
assertions of supervenience, by their very construction, have no well- 
defined content. For, in contrast to the more standard reductionist pro-
grams, the approaches which rely on supervenience abandon the necessity 
of providing an explicit description of the supervening domain in terms 
of the domain considered to be “fundamental.” Supervenience as used in 
recent discussions, therefore, is parallel to the scheme outlined by Leibniz 
18Jaegwon Kim, “Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept,” in Supervenience and Mind: 
Selected Philosophical Essays, ed. Ernest Sosa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
155.
19Nancy Murphy, “Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues,” in Whatever Hap-
pened to the Soul?, ed. Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Malony (Minne-
apolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 134.
20Cf. Paul Teller, “Supervenience,” in A Companion to Metaphysics, ed. J. Kim and E. Sosa 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 484–485. Nancey Murphy, “The Problem of Mental Causation: 
How Does the Reason Get its Grip on the Brain?,” Science and Christian Belief 14 (2002), 145, 
affirms that the “controversy over an exact definition of ‘supervenience’” has no importance 
for her use of the concept but she does not provide any argument for why that is the case.
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in his treatment of contingency. For him, events appear contingent when 
we, finite beings, cannot deduce them from the essence of things. However, 
from God’s point of view, everything is necessary. According to the analysis 
of philosopher of science Bas van Fraassen:
To have supervenience without reduction means to have no translation 
sentence by sentence or paragraph by paragraph or even definable set by 
definable set . . . but there is still a perfect description “at the far edge of 
infinity.”21 The supervenience claim then still entails only that there is, so to 
speak, a reduction for God or for the angels, just not for finite beings like us.
This is obviously a position designed to be irrefutable. What are the benefits of 
believing in such a relation of persons to physical objects? The mere assur-
ance of consistency? Cold comfort! Add to this that no such ideal “physical-
ist” language exists, or is likely ever to be had. . . . Why play these games?22
Note that the above argument does not rely on the deterministic or in-
deterministic character of physical law. Quantum mechanics introduces 
chance in the physical picture, but chance is as far from intentional action 
as deterministic Newtonian physics. The question is not about any specific 
feature of physical law; mind is of a different category than natural law. 
The point has often been argued,23 and convincingly in my opinion, so that 
I don’t feel the need to defend the case beyond the rebuttal of nonreduc-
tive physicalism. That it is often forgotten does not say anything against 
the quality of the argument, but about the force of received ideas. The 
assumption that science will eventually explain everything is one of the 
idols of our time. The failure of nonreductive physicalism in recent philos-
ophy of mind just adds another incident to show how easily the promises 
of this idol are believed—and how misleading they turn out to be, once 
closely examined.
4. Against “Scientifically Correct” Models of Divine (and Human) Action
What can we learn from the failure of nonreductive physicalism for the 
topic of divine action? There are some accounts (in the vicinity of process 
theology and panentheism) which come close to assimilating the divine to 
emergent properties of the universe.24 But if there is no physicalist account 
21Expression inspired by Blaise Pascal, Pensées (1670), ed. L. Brunschvicg, nº 233 (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1976), 114. 
22Bas Van Fraassen, “Transcendence of the Ego (The Non-existent Knight),” Ratio 17 (2004), 
474. Bas van Fraassen proposed the comparison with Leibniz at a conference on February 
10, 2004, at the CRÉA, Paris. 
23One thinks immediately of Descartes. For a brilliant twentieth-century defense, see: 
C. S. Lewis, Miracles: A Preliminary Study (London: Centenary Press, 1947), chaps. 3 and 4, 
and in a revised form (following criticisms by G. E. M Anscombe) in the 1960 edition. It is 
interesting to note that Thomas Nagel, while resisting theism—“I don’t want there to be a 
God; I don’t want the universe to be like that” (The Last Word [New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997], 130)—fully accepts the point that there is no physicalist explanation available 
for reason (ibid., 70–76, 115, 130–132, and passim).
24I am thinking here of accounts like Ian Barbour’s (“Indeterminacy, Holism and 
God’s Action”) and Philip Clayton’s (Mind and Emergence [Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
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available for human rationality and voluntary action, then the prospects 
of finding such an account for God’s action are more than dim.
Is the situation any better for those who maintain a fully transcendent 
deity? For them, it is clearly insufficient to consider the divine as an emer-
gent property of the world. Nor does it supervene on physical objects. 
Thus our critique does not apply directly. Nonetheless, even such ac-
counts start from the description of nature offered by today’s physics and 
try to see how divine action fits into this picture. The alleged openness 
of the physical level to higher emergent levels, via top-down causation, is 
a crucial element in those pictures as well, and God’s action is typically 
described as top-down influence, in analogy to causality exerted by higher 
levels of existence on lower levels. As they strive to provide an account 
of divine action without “intervention,” the openness of lower levels to 
higher levels is important in order to justify the belief that God can some-
how act on the physical world. It might not be possible to be more specific 
about the “somehow,” to pin down the exact nature of the “causal joint” 
through which God acts.25 Nevertheless, the emergent properties inside 
the natural realm are supposed to provide an analogue which proves that 
the openness of the world to God’s action is not an ad hoc assumption.
This worldview is basically nonreductive physicalism-plus-God, add-
ing God to what is considered to be a physical world with emergent prop-
erties. But given the failure of nonreductive physicalism, such accounts 
are simply incoherent. If there is no place for human mind and action in 
a physicalist world, why then go on and try to find divine action in it? If 
we cannot make sense of top-down causation for human action, starting 
out with physical objects, why expect it to be a useful notion for divine 
action? A more radical revision is necessary in order to account for divine 
action in the world.
Smedes accuses scientist-theologians of “scientism” (his study exam-
ines in close detail Polkinghorne and Peacocke). It could seem paradoxical 
to thus label authors who have given great labor to showing how a reli-
gious worldview is still possible for scientifically minded persons. It is not 
surprising that both Polkinghorne and Peacocke vigorously rejected this 
characterization of their positions.26 Nevertheless, I think that Smedes is 
basically right. If one looks for accounts of divine action which are sci-
entifically acceptable, one has de facto reduced God to a causal factor, 
entering into the same level of description as natural causes and therefore 
competing with them—in spite of all the well-meant talk about openness, 
emergence and top-down causation. That most scientist-theologians look 
to physics in order to provide this scientific description shows not only 
2004]). It is true that they put up safeguards in order to protect divine transcendence. With-
out going into details, may I just state that I consider them to be insufficient.
25Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God, 134–135, complains that Peacocke has nothing pre-
cise to offer on the nature of this causal joint (nor has Polkinghorne).
26Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God, 207ff.
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that they adopt a reductionist view of divine action (probably for most of 
them, against their better intentions), but also that they have bought into 
a reductionist picture of the world itself.
5. Creation as the Starting-point of Theistic Thinking about the World
How then can we hope to make any progress in what has been a long-
standing though, in my opinion, sterile project? Nothing less than a radi-
cal change will do, that is a change going down right to the roots of the 
discussion. There is one unchallenged presupposition in most current 
models of divine action: it has to comply with the picture which science, 
and more specifically physics (perhaps suitably perfected in the future), 
offers us of the world. Against the intentions of most of those who defend 
such models, this comes down to an idolization of physics. Smedes is jus-
tified in calling them scientistic. No theologically satisfactory account of 
God’s action can be found along these lines.
Instead of starting from physics in order to construct a scientifically ac-
ceptable view of divine action in the world, I suggest that we take as our 
starting-point creation. If God is the Creator of the universe, his action in 
it is not a problem to be figured out, but a reality to be acknowledged and 
the very foundation of whatever we can say about the world. Thus it is not 
so much God’s action which we need to account for, but the existence of 
physics (and of other natural sciences) in a created world. The title chosen 
for the Festschrift for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the CTNS is very 
telling in this regard. The authors look for God’s Action in Nature’s World.27 
But from the standpoint of creation, nature is God’s world; thus we have 
to look for God’s action in God’s world—which leads to a very different 
perspective, as we will see.
Should this move be criticized as being fideistic, simply affirming what 
we set out to explain? But note that it does not come down to replacing 
metaphysically neutral, theologically disengaged thought with a theologi-
cal mindset. Both frameworks of explanation start from unproven pre-
suppositions. The first considers that there is an all-embracing notion of 
being providing a frame in which to account for God’s action on the level 
of natural occurrences; the other is founded on the radical duality of the 
Creator and creation. But “the acceptance of the ultimacy of being is a peti-
tio principii; it mistakes a problem for a solution. The supreme and ultimate 
issue is not being but the mystery of being.”28 As Henri Blocher affirms:
Instead of the natural world, theology finds its starting-point in God, the sem-
per agens; it tells of his acts, before asking about being. . . . The starting-point, 
taught by Scripture, is the Creator-creature pattern. We cannot raise ourselves 
higher and dominate the constitutive structure, we cannot subsume it under 
27Peters and Hallanger, God’s Action in Nature’s World.
28Abraham J. Heschel, The Prophets II (New York: Harper, 1975), 43, quoted by Henri 
Blocher, “Divine Immutability,” in The Power and Weakness of God: Impassibility and Ortho-
doxy, ed. N. M. de S. Cameron (Edinburgh: Rutherford House, 1990), 15.
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an all-embracing notion of being. It involves a real duality, non-symmetrical: 
absolute independence on one side, total dependence on the other.29
Once we agree to reform our thinking, so that the Creator-creation 
duality becomes the basic pattern for understanding reality, the problem 
of God’s action in the world is not so much solved as dissolved. Instead of 
being provided with an answer, we discover that the question was badly 
framed. As the world is totally and utterly dependent on God, it can exist 
only if God continuously upholds it in existence. Thus, far from offering 
any resistance to divine action, it owes its very existence to God’s contin-
ued active involvement.
Natural sciences fit nicely into the picture. In fact, there is solid evidence 
for the historical role that the idea of creation played in the scientific revo-
lution. Several of the fundamental presuppositions of modern scientific 
method are natural consequences of theism: God—being both omnipotent 
and rational—institutes and upholds an ordered creation. This creation is 
at least partially accessible to our investigation, as humanity is created in 
the image of God. Studying the material world is as noble an occupation 
as “spiritual” subjects, as it is created by God and entrusted to human 
stewardship. The order of natural law, which is necessary for the system-
atic study of natural causes undertaken by science, is guaranteed both by 
God’s rationality and his faithfulness.
But even if there is no conflict between affirming God as primary cause 
and the scientific description of a process, do we not struggle with causal 
overdetermination due to the dual agency of God and natural causes? It 
has to be kept in mind that these agencies are not on the same level; thus, 
they do not compete with each other. In the framework of creation, no sec-
ondary cause can exert its influence unless sustained by the Creator. An 
anti-theist could still complain that postulating God’s providential con-
servation is an unnecessary metaphysical add-on to natural agency. But it 
is only unnecessary from the anti-theistic point of view. Seen in the con-
text of creation, God’s agency is the very foundation of any natural event.
In addition, there are substantial advantages of the theistic account 
compared to the anti-theistic account of natural agency. As we have seen 
briefly, creation provides grounds for several important presuppositions 
of the modern scientific method.30 In addition, it allows for miracles and 
it leads naturally to a multidimensional, non-reductionist view of the 
world. The anti-theist might accept the last point as a real advantage of 
creation, but will most probably not appreciate the leeway for miracles. 
But if there are historically reliable reports of miracles, it is an objective 
29Blocher, “Divine Immutability,” 16.
30Cf. for a more detailed exposition: Lydia Jaeger, Pour une philosophie chrétienne des sci-
ences (Nogent-sur-Marne/Cléon d’Andran: Éditions de l’Institut Biblique/Excelsis, 2006), 
chap. 3 (German translation: Wissenschaft ohne Gott? Zum Verhältnis zwischen christlichem 
Glauben und Wissenschaft [Bonn: Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft, 2007; Spanish transla-
tion: Hacia una filosofía cristiana de la ciencia [Grand Rapids, MI: Libros Desafío, 2011]).
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advantage that creation does make room for them. Let us now examine 
these two ideas.
6. Miracles
Conservatio (“conservation, sustenance”) is only one aspect of God’s action 
in the world, albeit a fundamental one. Going beyond providential up-
holding of natural workings, the biblical Scriptures also witness to a more 
direct divine involvement in history. God not only sustains the general 
course of nature, he also brings about singular events and pursues specific 
goals. C. John Collins has provided a very careful exegetical study which 
reveals numerous examples of what he calls “qualitatively special divine 
action,” that is, events which are carried out by a mode that “goes beyond 
the natural causal powers of the parties involved.”31 Although more cum-
bersome than the common term “intervention,” the term he uses is more 
precise in that it avoids the idea of a divine intrusion into the world. In a 
theistic framework, all events are in some sense related to divine action. 
Collins presents an impressive list of texts which explicitly contrast God’s 
action in specific cases with that which natural causes alone would have 
been able to accomplish: for example the interpretation of Pharaoh’s and 
Nebuchadnezzar’s dreams beyond any human power (Genesis 40:8; 41:16; 
Daniel 2:27–28), the conception of Jesus by the power of the Holy Spirit 
(Luke 1:34–35; Matthew 1:18–20), Jesus’s and the apostles’ miracles attest-
ing their divine mission (John 3:2; Acts 3:12), Christ’s resurrection (Acts 
17:31; Romans 1:4), the recognition of Jesus’s Lordship by sinful humans 
(1 Corinthians 12:3), and the resurrection of the flesh at the end of time 
(1 Corinthians 15:44, contrasting the actual body, called “natural,” Greek 
“psychikon,” and the future spiritual body, “pneumatikon”). The Philistines 
even designed an experiment in order to decide between a natural and a 
divine explanation of the plagues which had befallen them after they had 
captured the Israelite ark of the covenant (1 Samuel 6:7–9).32
Most, if not all, of the examples listed above would commonly be desig-
nated as miracles. There are divergent opinions about the exact definition 
of miracles. There are also quarrels about the question of whether God 
could and would perform miracles and if he did, whether we would be able 
to identify an event as miraculous. And doubts remain about the histori-
cal reliability of the biblical miracle accounts. Without opening the debate, 
which is beyond the scope of my paper, may I just say that the traditional 
definition of a miracle as an event which is brought about by God without, 
above, or against natural means33 seems to me perfectly workable. I also 
consider that the objections which are brought forth against the possibility, 
31C. John Collins, The God of Miracles: An Exegetical Examination of God’s Action in the 
World (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2000), 87.
32Ibid., chap. 6; on the last example, see 97.
33Cf. the Westminster Confession of Faith 5:3: “God, in his ordinary providence, maketh use 
of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them, at his pleasure.”
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the appropriateness, the recognizability and the historical occurrence of 
the biblical miracles, in particular those linked to Jesus himself, can be and 
have been successfully answered. Among others, the collective volume In 
Defence of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in the World, edited 
by R. D. Geivett and G. R. Habermas, provides a very complete rebuttal, 
thoroughly answering philosophical, theological and historical concerns.34 
C. S. Lewis’s book on Miracles is a classic in the field, providing much on-
going inspiration for anybody interested in the subject.
By definition, a miracle escapes any scientific account. Thus (as long as 
theism is an option), the question of how to imagine such an event given 
what we know scientifically about the world does not arise here—quite 
analogously to the case of what one may call general providence, but for 
the opposite reason. In “general” providence, God works through and in 
natural means; thus, the outcomes of his actions are identical to what we 
expect from the scientific description (as long as our theories get it at least 
reasonably right). With miracles, the scientific predictions are superseded 
by a greater power. As long as one keeps firmly to creation as the starting- 
point of thought, God’s action and scientific description can be jointly up-
held in both cases. In the first, the divine primary cause sustains the natu-
ral means so that the laws of nature are observed. Thus the result con-
forms to (correct) scientific models. In the second case, an event contrary 
to scientific theory occurs. There is thus no need to strive for a scientific 
rendering of such an event. The very fact that it does not comply with a 
scientific description provides evidence for its special status as a miracle.
7. Beyond Physicalism-plus-Miracles
We have by now arrived at a bipolar image of God’s action in the world: 
either working in line with the ordinary course of nature and thus in accor-
dance with scientific models, or superseding natural means in miraculous 
action and thus going against what we would expect from our scientific 
theories. Can we go any further or do we have to content ourselves with ac-
cepting these as two rather unconnected modes of divine action? Scientist-
theologians consider that non-reductive features of the world provide an 
important clue to understanding divine action in the world. Although we 
have seen that they do not succeed in establishing a robust non-reductive 
view of the world, I consider that their basic intuition in this regard is right. 
They err in how they argue for non-reductionism. Nevertheless we really 
live in a nonreductive world, and this fact is important in that it proves the 
failure of scientism. It also provides, inside the natural realm, an analogue 
for the openness of the world to God’s action. It allows us to see that provi-
dential upholding of nature and miraculous action are not two opposites, 
but that they are two modes (perhaps one can even speak of limiting cases 
on a continuum) of how the one Creator is present and active in his own 
34R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas, eds., In Defence of Miracles: A Comprehensive 
Case for God’s Action in the World (Leicester: Apollos, 1997).
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world. But instead of starting from a world inhabited by physical objects, 
it is essential to take seriously the created character of the world from the 
outset. Only thus can we arrive at a truly non-reductionistic image of the 
world.35 The good fit between a non-reductive view of the world and theism 
can even count as an argument in favor of theism, as many strive to resist 
reductionism, but do not always succeed in offering a convincing model, as 
we have seen for example with nonreductive physicalism.
Creation affirms the duality between God and the world. This alone 
shatters any hope that science would offer an understanding of everything 
that exists. The traditional doctrine of divine incomprehensibility implies 
that no description of God in purely scientific terms can be achieved. This 
fundamental limit of science finds an echo inside creation: just as some 
medieval artists represented themselves in their stained-glass windows 
or paintings, human beings, as the image of God, are a reminder that 
the Person transcends the objectifying methodology of the scientific ap-
proach. The traditional doctrine of the duality of human nature—a being 
composed of both body and spirit—expresses the twin truths that we are 
part of the visible creation yet have a special relationship with our Cre-
ator, overriding to a certain extent the natural order: with our body, we 
are plunged into creation; with our spirit, we lift our eyes to the Creator 
and dominate nature. Our intellectual creativity, ability to love, and moral 
responsibility cannot be exhaustively described in physical or chemical 
terms, the latter being appropriate for describing non-human creation.
Once this aspect of differentiation is acknowledged at the heart of cre-
ation, it becomes probable that the human realm is not the only one to 
escape the imperialism of physics, but that the created reality is multi-
faceted. The first chapter of Genesis contains several indications that im-
ply the plurality of domains in the created order. One of the key ways of 
presenting creation is the theme of separation: separation of light from 
darkness, of day from night, of the waters above from the waters below 
the “firmament,” of the sea from the dry land. Furthermore, plants and 
animals are created “according to their kinds.” The magisterial architec-
ture of the account structures the work of creation in six days and thereby 
suggests a multi-faceted reality.36
Thus ensues a non-reductionist vision of the created order: different as-
pects of reality have their own structuring principles. The (relative) auton-
omy of the different spheres is necessarily reflected by distinct methods 
of investigation, such that no approach to reality should claim superiority 
over another. Of course, the number and the boundaries of the different 
35The rest of this section is adapted from Lydia Jaeger, Ce que les cieux racontent: la science 
à la lumière de la création (Nogent-sur-Marne/Charols: Éditions de l’Institut Biblique/Excel-
sis, 2008), 111–113, 117–118, and Jaeger, “Les neurosciences face à la théologie,” 170.
36Al Wolters, “Creation as Separation: A Proposed Link between Bible and Theory,” in 
Facets of Faith and Science, ed. J. M. Van Der Meer (Lanham, MD: University Press of Amer-
ica, 1996), vol. 4, 347–352, particularly drawing on Paul Beauchamp, Création et séparation: 
étude éxégètique du chapitre premier de la Genèse (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1969).
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facets of existence are not determined by theological considerations alone; 
one cannot avoid an empirical examination of reality. Nevertheless, the 
doctrine of creation opposes any pretension of hegemony claimed by a 
particular science; in particular, physicalism is incompatible with a multi-
dimensional vision of reality.
Opposition to reductionism is a flagship theme of neo-Calvinism. 
Abraham Kupyer distinguished different “spheres” of creation. Each is 
autonomous, in the sense that the other spheres should not interfere and 
impose their own, foreign laws.37 Herman Dooyeweerd spoke, for his part, 
of “modal aspects, [which] delimit . . . the special viewpoints under which 
the different branches of empirical science examine the empirical world.” 
They are not distinctive domains of reality, but arise inside the temporal 
horizon of human experience. He sees the ego as “a supra-temporal, central 
unity,” but human experience “is refracted in the order of time into a rich 
diversity of modi, or modalities of meaning, just as sunlight is refracted 
by a prism in a rich diversity of colors.”38 The concrete phenomena of em-
pirical reality function, in principle, in all of these aspects. Dooyeweerd 
lists fifteen modal aspects—quantitative, spatial, kinematic, physical, 
biotic, sensory, logical, historical, linguistic, social, economic, aesthetic, 
justitial, ethical, fiduciary—arranged in a hierarchy of modes of experi-
ence. Depending on the context, one or other modal aspect becomes pre-
dominant, although the others will never be completely absent.39 For the 
modal aspects are abstractions arising from the distinct methodologies of 
particular sciences, such that every object already exists in the totality of 
these spheres. But in certain spheres, it has only passive capacities, while 
in others it has active and passive capacities. Take a stone, for example. It 
can move and be moved; so as far as kinetics is concerned, it has active and 
passive capacities. But in terms of linguistics, it only has passive capaci-
ties, since a stone cannot speak; it can, however, be spoken of. Similarly, 
it has passive economic capacities because it can be a currency for trade, 
i.e., be considered a “precious” stone. In this sense, a stone exists in all the 
spheres, even if only passively. One should not, therefore, ask how a purely 
physical reality could acquire the other modal aspects; rather, reality 
is by constitution multidimensional.
Thus, instead of starting with a physical description of reality, in which 
one tries to fit in the higher levels (in particular human freedom, rational-
ity and God’s action), we set out with a frank recognition of the multiple 
dimensions of reality. In fact, to ask how God—and humans—can act in a 
world described by physics is to ask the question the wrong way round: 
37A. Kuyper, “Sphere Sovereignty” (1880), in Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader, ed. 
James Bratt (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 461–490; cf. A. Kuyper, Stone Lectures on 
Calvinism (1898) (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 29.
38Herman Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought: Studies in the Pretended Au-
tonomy of Philosophical Thought (Nutley, NJ: Craig Press, 1975), 7–8.
39Roy A. Clouser, “A Sketch of Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy of Science,” in Facets of Faith and 
Science, ed. J. M. Van der Meer, vol. 2, 83–86.
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instead of taking multidimensional reality as the starting point, we limit 
ourselves to one abstraction (physics) that chooses a single facet of reality, 
and ask how we can find the other aspects from this perspective. This 
approach is obviously doomed to failure.
8. Physicalism Again
But is such a multidimensional perspective really acceptable for somebody 
who fully acknowledges the far-reaching triumphs of natural sciences, 
and in particular of physics, over the last centuries? In fact I would sug-
gest, quite to the contrary, that taking such a non-reductionist view is the 
only viable option for somebody fully aware of the scientific method. For 
modern science defined itself, at its inception, by a turning away from the 
ambitions of ancient Greek science, that aimed to understand the essence 
of things. This science only knew one possible description of a being; it 
sought to formulate the true definition:
Ancient sciences aimed at an unlimited objective. They defined their aims 
by asking questions like: ‘What is Nature?’ ‘What is Man?’ ‘What is Justice?’ 
‘What is Virtue?’ . . . 
The form of the question: ‘What is x?’ demands an answer telling you 
the essence of x; telling you everything you need know about x in order to 
work out a complete science of it. The idea of a science, for an ancient Greek, 
was not only the idea of a science of x but the idea of the complete science 
of x. There could be only one science of a given thing: for unless it grasped 
the essence of the thing it was not a science of it, and one thing had only one 
essence. When that was discovered, all the ‘properties’ of the thing could 
be deduced.40
Modern science, since its origins, has shown itself to be more humble and 
has set itself a more limited goal: to describe certain “affections” of ob-
jects, by adopting a specific point of view (for example kinetic, in Galileo’s 
famous inclined plane experiments). Thus it would be paradoxical to extrap- 
olate scientific results obtained by a strict limitation to specific perspectives 
and transform them into global all-embracing statements. Evandro Agazzi 
even speaks of “reductionism as negation of the scientific spirit.”41
Why, in our day, are many scientists and philosophers so fascinated 
with reductionism in its physicalist form? To answer this question, one 
must first recognize the pragmatic advantages of reductionist programs: 
our intellectual understanding and our means of technical control in-
crease with every successful reduction. Nevertheless, it hardly seems 
40Robin G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan: Or Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1942), 253.
41Evandro Agazzi, “Reductionism as Negation of the Scientific Spirit,” in The Problem of 
Reductionism in Science, ed. E. Agazzi (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1991), 1–29. On the self-consciously 
limited character of modern science: ibid., 5, 7; and Karl R. Popper , The Open Universe: An 
Argument for Indeterminism, ed. W. W. Bartley (London, Routledge, 1988), passim, in particu-
lar the three addenda: “Indeterminism is Not Enough: An Afterword,” “Scientific Reduction 
and the Incompleteness of All Science,” “Further Remarks on Reduction,” 113–175. 
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sufficient to stop at such utilitarian considerations, because reductionism, 
as an absolutization of an area of knowledge, is more than a harmless 
generalization of a process that has born (partial) fruit in the past. It corre-
sponds to a recurring answer that human thinking has formulated when 
faced with multiplicity: in the search for unity, it is tempting to reduce the 
many to the One, by eliminating the difference. We can detect in this the 
search for an immanent ersatz of the unity founded in the Creator. Even 
if multiplicity’s transcendent origin has been lost from view, the nostal-
gia for unity remains. Rather than seeking it in God, we have turned to 
reality, which we no longer know to be created, and have established a 
unifying principle within it. In this way, “the innate religious impulse of 
the human ego [is diverted] from its true origin and direct[ed] . . . upon 
the temporal horizon of experience with its diversity of modal aspects. 
By seeking itself and its absolute origin in one of these aspects, the think-
ing I turns to the absolutization of the relative.”42 By contrast, those who 
find multiplicity’s unity not in the creation but in the Creator are able to 
embrace the manifold richness of reality without imposing a reductionist 
perspective on it.
Conclusion
Let us recapitulate how far we have come in accounting for God’s action 
in the world by taking creation as our starting-point. We have not come 
up with a description couched in scientific language on how God acts 
in nature. Thus, strictly speaking, this paper does not offer an alterna-
tive to the scientist-theologians’ endeavors. In fact, it would contradict the 
very idea of creation if any such description were possible, as the Cre-
ator’s transcendence is fundamental to this understanding of reality. But 
we have achieved a picture of the world which provides good founda-
tions for the modern scientific method, which makes room for miracles 
and which leads to a multidimensional, non-reductionist understanding 
of the sciences. In addition, it even explains the illusionary attraction of 
reductionism, as a nostalgic yearning for the lost unity of reality, once the 
unique divine origin of the world is set aside.
Thus creation both grounds scientific inquiry and highlights its limits. 
It both affirms its value and safeguards against its idolization. Opposing 
scientism and the hegemony of physics, it makes room for complementary 
perspectives offered by the different special sciences. Non-reductionism, 
and in particular the irreducibility of mind to matter, provides an inner-
worldly analogue for the openness of the world to God’s action. It shows 
that science cannot be called in to “secure” us against God acting in this 
world. In fact, science—concerning its object of study and its method, both 
in its unity and in its diversity—owes its very existence to God’s active 
presence in the world. In case we were tempted to forget it, we should just 
look at ourselves:
42Herman Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought, 27.
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The Christian doctrine would be fantastic only if the present frontier- 
situation between spirit and Nature in each human being were so intelli-
gible and self explanatory that we just ‘saw’ it to be the only one that could 
ever have existed. But is it?
In reality the frontier situation is so odd that nothing but custom could 
make it seem natural, and nothing but the Christian doctrine can make it 
fully intelligible.43
Institut Biblique de Nogent-sur-Marne (France)
43Lewis, Miracles, 153.
This text was written for the Logos Workshop “Divine Action—God, Chance and Causation,” 
held on May 13–15, 2010, at Rutgers University. I thank Michael Rea and Dean Zimmerman 
for inviting me, all participants for stimulating discussions, and two anonymous referees for 
their comments.”
